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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants David Douglas and Terry Kerr have not stated any reason to reverse the trial 
court's judgment in N ationstar's favor. Their brief is a series of irrational, unsupported conspiracy 
theories. They do not cite to the record, nor do they otherwise identify facts supporting their 
assertions. The trial court's judgment should stand. 
Though Douglas' and Kerrs' brief fails to provide cogent argument, for the Court's 
reference, Nationstar will recite the background and history of the case to explain why the trial 
court was right to reject Douglas and Kerr's claims. Douglas and Kerr filed a complaint in 
Seventh District Court, Bonneville County, alleging wrongdoing in the servicing and foreclosure 
of real property they jointly owned. R. 8 - 20. The complaint brought causes of action for 
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, breach 
of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with contract, violation of the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) 15 U.S.C. 1601, violation of the anti-tying provision of the Bank Holding Company Act 
(BHCA) 12 U.S.C. 1972, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act(RICO) 18U.S.C.1962(c). R.13-20. 
Nationstar answered. R. 21 - 26. It then moved for summary judgment arguing the 
claims were barred by res judicata and failed on the merits. R. 80 - 226. The district court 
agreed and granted Nationstar judgment on all causes of action. R. 40 - 51. Douglas and Kerr 
appealed. R. 57 - 58. 
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Douglas and Kerr's brief consists primarily of unsupported arguments that the defendants, 
their counsel and Judge Simpson conspired against Douglas and Kerr. 1 Appellant's brief at 4 - 7. 
Douglas and Kerr claim they "presented evidence and the facts and the truth" to support their 
claims "but the culture of corruption in Idaho hands out injustice to crooks willing to pay for 
injustice." Appellant's brief at 9. They do not cite or describe that evidence. They claim "[t]he 
content of the claims were made plausible to the court, but the court did not care. The court was 
only interested in the pay for injustice." Appellant's brief at 8. They provide no citation to or 
description of evidence supporting these allegations of judicial misconduct. Douglas' and Kerr's 
claims are the same conclusory statements made in District Court about unspecified corruption 
and a conspiracy to deny them justice. 
The District Court correctly ruled all causes of action in the complaint are barred by res 
judicata and fail on the merits. Douglas filed a nearly identical complaint against Nationstar and 
Zions Bank in 2015 in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho (the prior 
federal action). The only differences between the complaint in the prior federal action and this 
case were the addition of Terry Kerr as a plaintiff and an increase in the damages demand. The 
U.S. District Court dismissed the federal claims in that case with prejudice and dismissed the 
state-law claims without prejudice. It correctly ruled the federal claims are barred by res 
judicata. Kerr also filed a substantively identical complaint in the Seventh District Court for 
Bonneville County, Idaho in 2015 against Nationstar, Zions Bank, and attorneys representing 
Nationstar (the prior state action). In that case the District Court granted summary judgment 
Appellants include an irrelevant and nonsensical diatribe against Warren Buffet and the 
Mormon church in their brief. Appellants' brief at 6. This is demonstrative of the unfounded 
theories underlying appellants numerous prior lawsuits. 
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for Nationstar, against Kerr. In this case the District Court correctly ruled because Douglas and 
Kerr were in privity disposition of the prior federal action also bars Kerr's claims and disposition 
of the prior state action also bars Douglas's claims. 
The District Court also correctly ruled all causes of action fail on the merits. The breach 
of contract fails because Douglas and Kerr identified no contract terms Nationstar allegedly 
violated. The breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim fails because they 
alleged no facts showing Nationstar prevented them from enjoying any terms of the loan contract 
and Kerr has no standing to pursue the claim. The unjust enrichment claim fails because 
Douglas did not dispute the enforceable contract with Nationstar and Kerr introduced no 
evidence supporting the claim. The breach of fiduciary duty claim fails because Douglas and 
Kerr do not allege how such a duty arose or any facts that might show Nationstar's alleged 
breach. The tortious interference with contract claim fails because N ationstar cannot interfere 
with its own contract and Kerr does not allege facts supporting the claim. The TILA claim is 
time barred. The BHCA claim fails because Douglas and Kerr alleged no service-tying. And the 
RICO claim is frivolous and fails to state a claim for relief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This lawsuit concerns two properties - 2895 Woodbridge Circle in Idaho Falls 
(Woodbridge Circle property) and 900 Wheatstone in Pocatello (Wheatstone property). 
R. at 9, 14. 
2. Douglas borrowed $273,000 (the loan) secured by a deed of trust on the 
Woodbridge Circle property. R. 201 -225. 
3. N ationstar serviced the loan and judicially foreclosed. Appellant's brief at 1. 
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4. Douglas and Kerr also claim an interest in the Wheatstone property. R. 9- I 0. 
Nationstar has no interest in that property. 
5. Douglas filed the prior federal action in the District of Idaho in February 2015. 
David Douglas v. Zions Bank NA. and Nationstar Mortgage LLC, in the United States District 
Court for the District ofldaho, Case No. CV15-055. R. 125 -137. 
6. In the prior federal action Douglas asserted federal causes of action for alleged 
violations of TILA, the anti-tying provision of the BHCA, and RICO. R. 125 - 137. He also 
brought state-law causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with 
contract. R. 125 - 13 7. 
7. The prior federal action was dismissed against Nationstar when the court granted 
Nationstar's motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 140. The court dismissed the federal 
causes of action with prejudice. R. 140. It dismissed the state claims without prejudice because 
it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. R. 140. 
8. Kerr filed the prior state action against Nationstar, Zions Bank and Nationstar's 
attorneys in this Court in 2015. Terry Kerr v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC et al. in the District 
Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, the State of Idaho in and for the County of 
Bonneville, CV-2015-2429. R. 142-154. 
9. Kerr and Douglas each claim a one-half interest in both the Woodbridge Circle 
and Wheatstone properties. R. 143. 
10. The substance of the complaint in the prior state action 1s identical to the 
complaint in this case (compare R. 8 - 20 with R. 142 - 154). 
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11. In the prior state action Nationstar moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for 
summary judgment and Judge Simpson granted summary judgment in favor of Nationstar by 
order dated September 22, 2015. R. 156 - I 74. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(1) Are Douglas' and Kerr's claims barred by res judicata where they were litigated 
previously in separate state and federal court cases, brought individually by each plaintiff, when 
the plaintiffs were in privity? 
(2) Do causes of action for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with contract, 
violation of the Truth in Lending Act, violation of the anti-tying provision of the Bank Holding 
Company Act, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act survive 
summary judgment when plaintiffs fail to allege facts or show evidence supporting the claims? 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALL CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY RES JUD/CATA 
The District Court correctly held Douglas' and Kerr's claims are barred by res judicata. 
R. 43 - 44. "Res judicata, or claim preclusion as it is sometimes called, denotes that a valid final 
judgment by a prior court, between the same parties or their privies, concludes the litigation as to 
all matters that were or should have been litigated in the first action." Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 792 P.2d 905, 907, 117 Idaho 880 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The dismissal of a complaint with prejudice results in those claims between the parties being 
barred by res judicata. Id. "In an action between the same parties upon the same claim or 
demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered 
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and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should 
have been litigated in the first suit." Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 855 P.2d 868,872, 
124 Idaho 31 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Privity is defined as a 
mutual or successive relationship to the same property rights, or such an identification in interest 
of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights." Sun Valley Land and Minerals, 
Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862,869, 853 P.2d 607 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). 
The complaint contains causes of action under federal law for alleged violations of TILA, 
BHCA, and RICO. R. 9 - I 2. These claims are identical to those in the prior federal action, but 
for the addition of Kerr as a plaintiff and an increase in the demand for damages from 
$30,000,000 to $50,000,000. Compare R. 8 - 20 with R. 133 - 136. The only differences are 
minor changes in the descriptions of the parties in paragraphs 1-9. R. 126 - 130. These causes 
of action are barred by res judicata as a result of being dismissed with prejudice in the prior 
federal action and decided on the merits in favor ofNationstar. Because Kerr and Douglas are in 
privity with each other, all claims arise out of their claimed shared interest in the Woodbridge 
Circle and Wheatstone properties, so neither may bring these claims. 
The prior state action was brought by Kerr against Nationstar. R. 142 - 154. The alleged 
facts are nearly identical to those in the complaint subject of this appeal and the causes of action 
are the same. Compare R. 8 - 20 with R. I 42 - 154. The prior state action resulted in a final 
adjudication on the merits in favor ofNationstar. R. 158 - 173. The District Court in this case 
correctly held because Kerr and Douglas are in privity with each other, the results of the prior 
state and federal actions bar both Douglas and Kerr from bringing the claims again in this case. 
R. 43-45. 
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Douglas and Kerr do not address res judicata in their brief. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DOUGLAS AND KERR ON THE MERITS 
The District Court correctly held all causes of action fail on the merits. R. 45 - 51. 
Douglas and Kerr allege federal causes of action for violation of TILA, violation of the anti-tying 
provision of the BHCA, and violation under RICO. R. 9 - 12. They allege state law claims for 
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract. R. 6 - 8. 
A. THE TILA CLAIM IS TIME BARRED 
Douglas and Kerr claim Nationstar violated TILA by failing to provide required loan 
disclosures. R. 9. Under TILA and its associated regulations, a lender must make certain 
disclosures at, or before, consummation of the transaction. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.17 to .19. TILA 
does not require ongoing disclosures after the consummation of the loan unless the loan is 
refinanced or assumed. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.20. A claim for damages under TILA must be filed 
"within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). A TILA 
violation occurs, and the one-year limitations period begins to run, "when the [P]laintifll] 
executed [his] loan documents, because [he] could have discovered the alleged disclosure 
violations and discrepancies at that time." Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
656 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011). 
The loan was made on January 3, 2006. R. 4, 176. TILA imposes no obligation to make 
disclosures after that date. The loan was modified on April 1, 2010 (R. 4, 198 - 200) but TILA 
does not apply to home loan modifications. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(b)(l)(ii)(f). The statute of 
limitations for a TILA claim expired January 3, 2007. Douglas and Kerr failed to bring his TILA 
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claim until May 24, 2016, over nine years outside the statute of limitations. The District Court 
correctly held the TILA claim is time barred. 49 - 50. 
Douglas and Kerr do not address TILA or its statute of limitations in their opening brief. 
B. THE ANTI-TYING PROVISION OF BHCA IS INAPPLICABLE 
Douglas and Kerr allege Nationstar violated the anti-tying provision of BHCA by altering 
the mortgage contract. R. 9 - 10. The BHCA does not regulate a bank's ability to modify a 
mortgage loan. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1). It prevents a bank from extending credit on the 
condition that a borrower use the bank's other services. Id. Douglas and Kerr alleged no service-
tying by Nationstar and the District Court correctly dismissed this claim. R. 50. 
Douglas and Kerr's arguments regarding the BHCA lack substance. They assert the 
BHCA states "the original mortgage contract cannot vary the servicer, the conditions, the 
requirements, from the original mortgage." Appellants' brief at 5. They do not cite a specific 
statute establishing this prohibition. Their argument also appears circular and illogical. How 
could an original mortgage contract vary the terms of the original mortgage? The District Court 
correctly entered judgment for N ationstar. 
C. THE RICO ALLEGATIONS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM 
Douglas and Kerr allege Nationstar was involved in an illegal enterprise and pattern of 
racketeering activity. R. 10 - 12. "To state a claim under RICO [a] plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) the conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, ( 4) of racketeering activity." Ricotta 
v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 977 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (dismissing a pro se complaint with 
prejudice because "[p]laintiff [could not] establish a pattern ofracketeering activity"). 
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Douglas and Kerr failed to allege facts showing respondents comprise "an ongoing 
organization, formal or informal" or "continuing unit." See United States v. Turkette, 
452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (describing the proof necessary to establish an "enterprise" under 
RICO). In Ricotta, the court dismissed a pro se plaintiffs RICO claim with prejudice because 
the plaintiff failed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. Ricotta, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 977. 
The court held: "[a]t a minimum, to show a pattern of racketeering activity [p]laintiff must 
illustrate that 'the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of 
continued criminal activity."' Id. (quoting HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 
492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)). Courts have held RICO is not implicated in normal foreclosure 
proceedings, such as those at issue in this case. See Coward v. First Magnus Fin. Corp., 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101846, at *14 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2009) ("RICO claims arising from 
garden-variety foreclosure actions are frivolous stalling actions that abuse the court system."). 
Douglas and Kerr alleged no facts support the RICO claim. The District Court correctly 
held this claim was "frivolous" and dismissed it. R. 50 - 51. In their brief on appeal, Douglas 
and Kerr baldly assert a RICO violation occurred, and argue "this can be totally proven using 
section 215 of the patriot act." Appellants' brief at 5. They do not allege how, and have failed to 
show the District Court erred by entering judgment for N ationstar. 
D. THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM FAILS TO ALLEGE FACTS 
SHOWING A BREACH BY NATIONSTAR. 
The breach of contract claim is based on vague allegations regarding Douglas' mortgage 
and forced placed insurance and tax charges. R. 6. "A breach of contract action includes the 
following essential elements: (1) the existence and terms of a contract; (2) that plaintiff 
performed or tendered performance pursuant to the contract; (3) breach of the contract by the 
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defendant; and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
760 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). The District Court correctly held Douglas 
and Kerr failed to identify any terms of the loan contract Nationstar allegedly breached. R. 46. 
Douglas and Kerr do not try to remedy or explain these defects in their opening brief. 
E. THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE DOUGLAS HAS 
A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH NATIONSTAR AND KERR GAVE NO 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CLAIM. 
The unjust enrichment claim makes no identifiable allegations against Nationstar. R. 14. 
To the extent the claims are construed to be based on the same alleged wrongdoing as the breach 
of contract claim - the loan for the Woodbridge Circle property - that agreement is contained in 
the written loan documents. 
Douglas' cause of action for unjust enrichment cannot succeed because "there [is] an 
enforceable express contract covering the same subject matter." Wilhelm v. Johnston, 
30 P.3d 300, 307 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). Under Idaho law, "[a] right of recovery in quasi-
contract, also known as unjust enrichment, occurs where the defendant has received a benefit 
which would be inequitable to retain at least without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that 
retention is unjust." Id. (quotations omitted). The doctrine of unjust enrichment is not 
permissible where there is an enforceable express contract between the parties which covers the 
same subject matter. Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 165 P.3d 261, 272 (Idaho 2007). Because 
Douglas is a party to the contract the District Court correctly held he cannot bring a cause of 
action for unjust enrichment. R. 4 7 - 48. As to Kerr, the unjust enrichment claims fails because 
he introduced no evidence supporting the claim. R. 48. Douglas and Kerr do not try to remedy 
or explain these defects in their opening brief. 
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F. THE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE 
NATIONSTAR OWES DOUGLAS AND KERR NO FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
The claim for breach of fiduciary duty was properly dismissed because N ationstar owes 
them no fiduciary duty. R. 48 - 49. "It is well settled that 'Idaho law establishes that no 
fiduciary duty ordinarily arises between parties to an arm's length business transaction."' Burton 
v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39642, at *16 (D. Idaho Mar. 1, 2012) 
(quoting Wade Baker & Sons Farms v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 42 P.3d 715, 721 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002)). "No fiduciary relationship 
generally exists in the context of a debtor-creditor relationship, including that of a lender-
borrower." Id. To establish a fiduciary duty in this context "[t]he facts and circumstances must 
indicate that the one reposing the trust has foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or 
presenting arguments is acting not in his own behalf, but in the interests of the other party." Id. 
at * 18 ( quoting High Valley Concrete, LLC v. Sargent, 234 P .3d 7 4 7 (Idaho 2010) ). The District 
Court correctly held Douglas and Kerr failed to identify why Nationstar owed them a fiduciary 
duty or how Nationstar breached that alleged duty. R. 48. Douglas and Kerr do not try to 
remedy or explain these defects in their opening brief. 
G. THE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT FAILS 
BECAUSE NATIONSTAR CANNOT INTERFERE WITH ITS OWN 
CONTRACT AND KERR ALLEGES NO FACTS TO SUPPORT THE 
CLAIM. 
Under Idaho law, intentional interference requires "intentional interference causing a 
breach of contract." Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 859 
(Idaho 1991) (emphasis in original). A party cannot interfere with a contract to which it is a 
party. The District Court correctly dismissed this claim by Douglas because Douglas and 
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N ationstar are parties to the loan contract and by Kerr because Kerr does not allege what contract 
Nationstar allegedly interfered with or how that interference was tortious. R. 49. Douglas and 
Kerr do not try to remedy or explain these defects in their opening brief. 
III. NATIONSTAR'S COUNSEL'S MISSTATEMENT AT THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT HEARING WAS IMMATERIAL AND QUICKLY CORRECTED. 
Douglas and Kerr claim Nationstar's counsel lied at the hearing on Nationstar's summary 
judgment motion on September 20, 2016. Appellants' brief at 1. At the hearing Nationstar's 
counsel mistakenly stated the Idaho Court of Appeals had decided Douglas' appeal of 
Nationstar's foreclosure, affirming judgment in Nationstar's favor. R. at 247. He indicated this 
ruling may provide further support for Nationstar's res judicata argument. Id. Nationstar filed a 
notice of clarification explaining the mistake the next day on September 21, 2016. R. 24 7 -
248.2 There is nothing in the District Court's order indicating this misstatement affected the 
court's decision to grant Nationstar judgment. R. 40 - 51. The District Court did not rule on 
Nationstar's motion until October 6, so it was aware of Nationstar's correction of the 
misstatement. R. 40-51. The District Court did not rely on Nationstar's counsel's misstatement 
in deciding this case in Nationstar's favor. R. 40-51. The misstatement was immaterial and 
quickly corrected and should not affect this appeal. 
2 The Idaho Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the District Court's judgment on October 3, 
2016. See Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. David A. Douglas et al, Docket No. 43540-2015, 
Bonneville Co. No. CV-2015.239. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly ruled Douglas' and Kerr's claims are barred by res judicata 
and fail on the merits, granting judgment to Nationstar on all causes of action. The District 
Court's decision should be affirmed. 
Submitted this 19th day of July, 2017. 
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